Sometimes the Fact That Nobody is Happy Does Not Equal a Good Solution

I listened to the first half or so of President Obama’s speech before I had to head into my kid’s basketball game.  I finally got around to reading the rest of it.  Overall, I was highly disappointed.  I saw no definitive objective or plan other than to start withdrawing our forces in July of 2011.  If that’s the case, we might as well withdraw now.  Power Line has a good analysis.

Earlier today I wondered whether President Obama’s speech about Afghanistan would sound more like a description of a war plan or a structured settlement of a legal dispute. What I heard tonight tilted decidedly in the latter direction. To be precise, the speech sounded to me like a slick lawyer trying to sell a dubious settlement to a skeptical client or, in this case, set of clients.

Consistent with slick salesmanship - as well as the president’s character - the speech was quite self-referential. Providing a potted history of our military efforts in the war on terrorism, Obama took shots at his predecessor and attempted to cast himself as the hero throughout. Thus, he patted himself on the back for opposing the war in Iraq, on which he blamed the current difficulties in Afghanistan.

Obama also patted himself on the back for bringing the war in Iraq to a “responsible end.” But he failed to mention the surge in Iraq, which was instrumental in turning the tide to the point that it became possible to speak of a responsible end.

The omission was odd inasmuch as Obama was pitching a similar surge in Afghanistan. This meant that the Iraq surge was more relevant to tonight’s speech than any other element of Obama’s potted history. Yet he was too partisan, and too embarrassed by his own opposition to the surge, to mention this vital decision.

It was therefore rank hypocrisy for Obama latter to decry the partisanship that has plagued the war on terrorism.

[...]

More importantly, Obama set July 2011 as the target date for beginning our withdrawal. Although he did add that conditions on the ground will be taken into account, it is difficult to understand how the U.S. will secure the support and commitment it needs from a critical mass of Afghans when they know, or have strong reason to believe, we will be starting to pull out only about a year after we have ramped up.

Indeed, Obama’s timetable threatens to undermine not just the first prong of his strategy (military) but also second and third prongs (civilian and Pakistan). With only a short-term commitment, we’re not likely to exert much influence on civilian behavior. Nor are the Pakistanis likely to be impressed by an America that’s more interested in a prompt exit, so it can save money and focus on domestic issues (points Obama emphasized near the end of his speech), than in defeating its enemies.