Photo courtesy Google Maps.
Congrats to BVBigBro.
See the extended entry for details.
This is the Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument and Custer National Cemetery, at the site of the Battle of the Little Bighorn.
In 1876, the U.S. Army planned a three-pronged attack on Indian forces known to be in the Power River area of Northern Wyoming. Forces under Brig. Gen. George Crook would approach from the south, Col. John Gibbon from the west, and Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry from the east.
The plan quickly fell apart. On June 17, 1876, Crook’s forces were stopped at the Battle of the Rosebud far south of their intended destination. Terry and Gibbon’s forces met at the mouth of the Rosebud River, and the commanders devised a plan to trap the Indian forces along the Little Bighorn. They would split their two columns and trap the Indians from two directions.
As Terry began his maneuver, one of his units, the 7th Cavalry under Lt. Col. George Custer located a large Indian trail. The 7th Cavalry was detached to pursue the trail, with orders not to engage the Indians until Terry’s and Gibbon’s columns could converge.
Despite repeated warnings from his Indian scouts, Custer decided to split his small force and conduct his own envelopment of the Indian encampment. Custer took Troops C, E, F, I, and L to attack the camp from the north. Custer’s immediate command numbered 13 officers, 198 men (7 of whom would eventually be detached before the “last stand”) and 3 civilians. Troop C was commanded by Custer’s brother, Capt. Thomas Custer, and L Company by his brother-in-law, 1st Lt. James Calhoun.
Custer sent Maj. Marcus Reno to attack the encampment from the south, and on the opposite bank of the Little Bighorn. Reno commanded Troops A, G, and M, which numbered 11 officers, 131 men, and approximately 35 Indian scouts.
A third force under Capt. Frederick Benteen consisted of Troops D, H, and K, with 5 officers and 110 men. Its exact orders are in doubt, but it was out of range to provide immediate support to either Custer’s or Reno’s forces.
Bringing up the rear was the he regimental pack train, consisting of 7 or 8 troopers from each company and escorted by Troop B. Commanded by Capt. Thomas McDougall, this force numbered 2 officers, 127 men, and 7 civilian packers.
Upon entering the valley, Maj. Reno deployed his men in a skirmish line to the south of the village. His small force was quickly driven back in the face of a massive counterattack, and conducted an organized retreat to the banks of the Little Bighorn. This fallback position was also quickly overwhelmed, and his men conducted a disorganized retreat across the river and up the bluff to the east of the river. At this point, Capt. Benteen’s force arrived, and Benteen’s arrival is widely recognized as the only reason Reno’s force was not wiped out.

Reno / Benteen Battlefield
At the same time, Custer’s force proceeded north along the ridgeline. In the face of overwhelming Indian forces, Custer’s command quickly broke down. Recent archaeological evidence indicates that there may not have even been a last stand, but rather one giant overwhelming rush of Indians. Custer fell on Last Stand Hill, and Custer’s brother-in-law, Lt. Calhoun, on nearby Calhoun Hill. Many troopers made desperate attempts to flee down the ravines to the river, and back down the ridgeline to Reno/Benteen. All were cut down. At some point during the fight, a company under Capt. Thomas Weir, acting without orders, broke from the Reno/Benteen battlefield and attempted to relieve Custer. This force was turned back at a high bluff now known as Weir Point.
When the fight was over, Custer’s immediate command had been wiped out. Reno and Benteen had suffered heavy casualties, but managed to save their commands.
In the aftermath of the battle, Custer’s followers (most notably his wife) put on a PR blitz to save his reputation. Unfortunately, they were largely successful for a very long time. As a result, Reno and Benteen saw their names dragged through the mud, and their careers negatively impacted, despite the fact that they did all they could reasonably have done under the circumstances.
BTW, every one in awhile there’s a show on TV about the archaeological digs at the battlefield site. If you can catch it, do. They demonstrate how they’ve been able to track the movement of individual soldiers and weapons across the battlefield through the use of forensics and ballistics.
Crawford Texas?
Custer’s portion of the Little Bighorn Battlefield, one of the coolest places in the country if you’ve never been there and are into that sort of thing.
See the extended entry for details.
” I protest the name of Reno on the Reno / Benteen Battlefield” was supposedly said by Lt. Godfrey during the hearings. Benteen led the fight on the southern part of the battlefield after Reno lost his cool.
I have no doubt that Benteen was the better commander. But, Reno didn’t deserve the criticism he received for not coming to Custer’s aid. He and Benteen combined were barely able to salvage their own commands, much less rescue Custer’s forces 4 miles away.
No, Custer split his command into five pieces and sent them all over God’s green earth. He never did support Reno, and probably never had the foggiest idea he was in trouble until about 15 minutes before he died. Custer split his command up at the Washita too, and lost a large chunk of those men.
Ranald McKenzie was probably the best U.S. commander on the plains.